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Abstract
We develop an incomplete-information theory of economic voting, where voters’ per-
ceptions of macro-economic performance are affected by economic conditions of people
similar to themselves. Our theory alleviates two persistent issues in the literature:
it shows how egotropic motivations can lead to behavior that appears sociotropic,
and why relying exclusively on aggregate data may underestimate the amount of eco-
nomic voting. We test our theory using both cross-sectional and time series data. We
document new stylized facts in aggregate data: state-unemployment is robustly cor-
related with national economic evaluations and presidential support. A novel survey
instrument that asks respondents their numerical assessment of the unemployment rate
confirms that individuals’ economic perceptions respond to the economic conditions of
people similar to themselves. Further, these perceptions associate with individuals’
vote choices.
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seminar audiences at LSE, MIT, NYU, Temple and Yale for useful feedback and comments.
1 Introduction
One of the most robust relationships in political science is economic voting: the positive
correlation in aggregate, time-series, data between an area’s economic performance and the
political performance of incumbent politicians and parties. Many theories have been pro-
posed to explain this phenomena.1 For example, egotropic, or pocketbook, theories posit
that individuals vote based on evaluations of their own economic circumstances, while so-
ciotropic theories posit that individuals vote based on their evaluations of national economic
conditions (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Kiewiet, 1983). However, as aggregate economic con-
ditions are just the average of individual economic circumstances, these two theories, like
most theories of economic voting, produce the same prediction in aggregate data.
We construct an incomplete-information theory of economic voting that produces a more
nuanced prediction in aggregate data: namely local economic conditions affect the economic
vote for national office. Voters have little incentive to expend costly effort gathering economic
information to make political decisions (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1991). Rather, individuals
gather economic information to inform personal economic choices, and use the same informa-
tion to inform their political choices. The economic information that individuals find both
the most useful for consumption smoothing and easiest to obtain is information about people
similar to them in terms of profession, age, education level, race, location of residence and
so on. Following some economists, we refer to these groups as individuals’ mecro-economies
(so called because they are somewhere between macro- and micro-economy). Thus, mecro-
economic voting predicts that that voters’ perceptions of the aggregate economy, and there-
fore political support, will correlate with conditions in their mecro-economies. An implication
is that evaluations of national economic conditions and presidential approval will be worse
in geographic areas with higher unemployment.
This more nuanced prediction seems to immediately falsify our theory, as it contrasts with
1The literature on economic voting is truly massive. For recent reviews of the literature see Lewis-Beck
and Paldam (2000) and Hibbs (2006).
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previous studies that have found no effect of state unemployment on presidential vote share
across time (Strumpf and Phillippe, 1999; Eisenberg and Ketcham, 2004).2 However, this
lack of findings likely stems from two data issues. First, state and national unemployment are
highly correlated, and second, there have been relatively few presidential elections since the
collection of disaggregated economic data began. This suggests that the absence of evidence
about the importance of local conditions reflects a lack of statistical power, rather than an
absence of local effects.
Indeed, when we construct a time-series of state-level presidential approval from Gallup,
by month, from 1981 to 2008, we find that state unemployment is robustly related to sup-
port for the incumbent. Moreover, using data from the American National Election Study
(ANES) over the same time period, we find that respondents from states with higher rates
of unemployment report more negative retrospective economic evaluations, after controlling
for national trends. These new empirical findings suggests that theories of economic voting
that do not explicitly account for the effects of local conditions are necessarily incomplete.3
Our theory separates the steps involved in forming economic evaluations, and focuses on
economic perceptions. All theories of economic voting require that individuals form percep-
tions of the economy, and then judge whether the economy is performing well or poorly based
on those perceptions, in order to form an economic evaluation. We predict that perceptions
of aggregate economic performance will reflect mecro-economic conditions, especially when
information about aggregate economic conditions is not easily observable. Testing this pre-
diction is difficult as most economic survey questions, like the ANES retrospective economic
evaluation, confound individuals’ perceptions and judgments of economic performance.
2Studies focusing on specific elections find mixed evidence about the relationship between state economic
conditions and presidential candidates vote shares. This mixed evidence reflects, in part, the difficulty of
fully controlling for variables that jointly affect local economic conditions and presidential vote shares in
cross-sectional data, and points to the importance of controlling for state level fixed effects across time, as
we do in our analysis.
3While there are several studies that find retrospective economic evaluations are correlated with national
economic conditions (for example: Clarke and Stewart, 1994; Haller and Norpoth, 1994, 1997) and that
gubernatorial popularity and votes are correlated with state economic conditions (for example: Hansen,
1999; Wolfers, 2002; Cohen and King, 2004), we believe we are the first to document an independent effect
of state economic conditions on national economic evaluations and political support across time.
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In order to examine how mecro-economic conditions affect perceptions of the aggregate
economy, we use a novel survey instrument from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election
Survey (CCES) that asks respondents to report their perception of the national unemploy-
ment rate. This instrument allows us to directly compare real world rates of unemployment
with respondents’ perceptions.4 In accordance with theory, we find that individuals who
are more likely to be unemployed (but are employed), report higher national unemployment
rates. Specifically, women, African-Americans, low-income workers all report higher rates of
national unemployment. Consistent with aggregate patterns, individuals from states with
higher unemployment rates also report higher unemployment. Moreover, reported unem-
ployment rates associate with vote choice, even when controlling for numerous other factors.
Additionally, our theory predicts that perceptions of aggregate economic conditions will
be more homogeneous among individuals that actually observe information about the ag-
gregate economy. As the national unemployment rate is often reported in national news, we
predict that people who watch national news will report more homogenous perceptions of
aggregate economic conditions than those who do not. In contrast, as gas prices are rarely
reported in national news, we predict that perceptions of gas prices will be similar among
those who do and do not watch national news. These predictions are empirically supported.
Our theory tempers two persistent conflicts in the economic voting literature. First, it
shows how egotropic motivations can lead to behavior that appears sociotropic. In particular,
we formalize a model that shows when voters’ own economic circumstances diverge from
their signal of aggregate economic performance, they will vote on the basis of aggregate
economic perceptions. This is not because individuals have sociotropic motivations. Rather,
an individual’s own economic circumstance is a very noisy signal of the performance of their
mecro-economy. This connection is useful as it contributes to resolving a significant conflict
in the literature: egotropic voting is cognately simpler and more consistent with rational
4This follows Alvarez and Brehm (2002) in focusing on hard information when assessing the information
sets of respondents, which may better isolate variation in reported economic evaluations that are rooted in
differences in actual economic perceptions (Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg, 2011).
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voting (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Gomez and Wilson, 2001), yet evidence
overwhelmingly points to sociotropic behavior by voters.
Second, our theory challenges Kramer’s (1983) injunction against using individual level
data to study economic voting due to concerns about the sources of heterogeneity in such
data. We show that a substantial portion of the cross-sectional variation in economic per-
ceptions is driven by real differences in perceptions of aggregate conditions.
1.1 Relation to the Literature
This paper contributes to the general literature on economic voting by providing a theory
with testable implications in both aggregate and cross-sectional data, and documenting new
empirical facts in aggregate, time-series, data. We contribute to the literature on hetero-
geneity in economic evaluations by drawing attention to the distinction between economic
perceptions and the judgment of those perceptions in forming economic evaluations, and
documenting new empirical facts about economic perceptions. As our work does not con-
tribute to understanding heterogeneity in economic judgments, it is a natural complement
to recent work on how individuals’ attribute economic performance to politicians.
Economic Voting. This manuscript is unique as it uses both aggregate and individual
data to test a novel theory; this difference is facilitated by the fact that our theory makes
predictions in aggregate data that go beyond the standard prediction that better aggregate
economic performance leads to better incumbent performance.5 Moreover, we are the first
to demonstrate that heterogeneity in aggregate economic perceptions has consequences for
political support, using the sort of aggregate, time-series data endorsed by Kramer (1983).
5Since Kramer’s (1983) influential critique, research on economic voting has largely been split between
work that considers variations in aggregate, time-series data, and that which considers individual, cross-
sectional data. Most aggregate studies relate time-series variation in aggregate economic measures to time-
series variation in political support. These economic measures can either be objective measures of economic
performance like economic growth or the unemployment rate (for example: Kramer, 1971) or aggregated
subjective economic evaluations (for example: MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Erikson, MacKuen and
Stimson, 2002). This contrasts with individual-level studies that relate cross-sectional variation in economic
evaluations with political preferences (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Duch and Stevenson, 2008).
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Kramer (1983) asserts that much of the cross-sectional variation in economic perceptions
is driven by extraneous factors.6 However, our theory suggests, and our results show, that as
cross-sectional variation in economic evaluations is driven by actual differences in economic
perceptions, ignoring it is costly. For example, in our theory, informational differences may
lead one voter to support the incumbent because he or she perceives the economy is perform-
ing well, while another voter, in the same election, supports the challenger because he or
she perceives the economy is performing poorly.7 Both votes are identified as economically
based in cross-sectional data, but cancel each other out in aggregate data.8
Heterogeneity in Economic Evaluations. Theories of economic voting require that
individuals form perceptions of the economy, and then judge those perceptions, in the process
of forming economic evaluations. However, variants of the retrospective economic evaluation,
the modal source of cross-sectional data, elicits respondents’ evaluations, which confound
perceptions and judgments. That is, heterogeneity in retrospective economic evaluations
may result either because voters have different information about economic conditions, or
because voters differ in how they judge these perceived economic conditions.
Mecro-economic voting theory predicts that differences in what economic information is
relevant and available to individuals will lead to heterogeneity in perceptions of the aggregate
economy. Specifically, those with greater risks of unemployment should perceive higher levels
of unemployment. Therefore, we directly elicit unemployment perceptions by asking respon-
dents what the national unemployment rate is.9 This is related to the substantial literature
examining heterogeneity in economic evaluations, although we focus on perceptions.10
6Van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2007, pp. 195–196) build on this critique and conclude, “Studies
estimating the effects of subjective evaluations cannot be taken seriously as proper estimates of the effects
of economic conditions.”
7The results in Hetherington (1996) suggest this may have occurred in the 1992 presidential election.
8As a result, it is not surprising that the associations between economic conditions and vote choice
identified using aggregate, time-series, data tend to be smaller than those identified using cross-sectional
data (Duch and Armstrong, 2010).
9Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg (2010) details the construction of questions that ask about nu-
meric quantities, like the unemployment rate, and how these questions can be used to ascertain whether
partisanship affects economic perceptions, judgments, or reporting.
10See Kiewiet (1983); Weatherford (1983a,b); Conover, Feldman and Knight (1986); Kinder, Adams and
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Our work is thus most closely related to a small literature that examines how different
groups respond to economic information across time. Hopkins (2011) shows that stock-
market returns affect the economic expectations of high income earners more than low in-
come earners. Similarly, Krause (1997) finds that economic news only affects the economic
expectations of those with a college education. In contrast, Haller and Norpoth (1997) finds
no difference in economic information between those who do and do not consume news.
However, none of this work links differences in groups’ economic information to support for
the incumbent.
Attributional Theories. Recent theorizing on economic voting, inspired by classic work
that notes the asymmetric impacts of good versus bad economic news, focus on heterogeneity
in voters’ judgments of economic conditions, rather than differences in perceptions (Bloom
and Price, 1975; Rudolph, 2003). These attributional theories are largely complementary to
ours: we focus on issues purposefully ignored by attributional theories, and vice-versa.
In particular, Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2003, 2006) find that politically unsophisticated
voters use sociotropic evaluations, whereas politically sophisticated voters rely on pocket-
book evaluations. This work largely assumes that voters have similar information, but make
judgments using different criteria. Indeed, the authors state, “Were [differences in informa-
tion] the only relevant cognitive factor, one would certainly expect less sophisticated people
to be more likely to engage in pocketbook voting.” (Gomez and Wilson, 2001, p. 901).
Another strand of this literature focuses on the media’s role in helping individuals translate
information into political preferences (Mutz, 1992a, 1994). Adding different evaluative cri-
teria for different voters would be straight-forward in our framework—we refrain from doing
so only because it produces no insights beyond those already in the literature.
Gronke (1989); Mutz (1992b, 1993, 1994); Hetherington (1996); Holbrook and Garand (1996); Anderson,
Duch and Palmer (2000); Palmer and Duch (2001); Duch and Palmer (2002); Anderson, Mendes and Tverdova
(2004); Duch and Stevenson (2008); Reeves and Gimpel (2011) for some notable examples. Much of the recent
work on this topic focuses on the relationship between partisanship and economic evaulations (Wlezien,
Franklin and Twiggs, 1997; Anderson, Mendes and Tverdova, 2004; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Evans and
Pickup, 2010). Previous studies have found observables such as gender, race, and education often have
significant associations with cross-sectional variation in economic evaluations.
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Finally, as, in our model, individuals are motivated to collect information to understand
their economic risk, there is a connection with the substantial literature on how economic
risk affects attitudes towards trade policy and redistribution (see Scheve and Slaughter,
2004, 2006; Rehm, 2009, forthcoming, for recent examples).
The next two sections develop the theory of mecro-economic voting. The fourth section
considers aggregate data. The fifth section shows variations in individual perceptions of
unemployment are consistent with our theory, and the sixth, that reported vote choices are
also consistent. The seventh concludes.
2 Theory
Our theory starts from the observation that the economy is not monolithic: there are different
sectors of the economy, and different professions within a given sector that may have different
fortunes over the same time period. These trends are somewhere between the micro- and
the macro-economy, a space economists sometimes refer to as the mecro-economy.
We also assume that voters are egotropic: they vote based on their own economic circum-
stances. While there are many mechanisms that might lead to similar patterns of political
support, we adopt a particularly simple formulation. Specifically, as a by-product of eco-
nomic planning, individuals also obtain information on the effect of the incumbents’ policies
(Popkin, 1991). This information causes them to update their beliefs about whether the
incumbent’s policies are good or bad for them. Each individual compares his or her ex-post
belief to a common baseline, and votes for the incumbent if his or her ex-post belief is greater
than the baseline, and otherwise he or she votes for the opposition.
Individuals invest in economic information to the extent it increases their own utility. In
the case of unemployment, individuals gather information about others’ employment status
to gain information about their own future income.11 As shown formally in the appendix,
11We focus throughout on unemployment because it is important for economic voting, is directly expe-
rienced by individuals, and varies markedly, and measurably, between groups. when using higher quality
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holding costs equal, an individual prefers signals of current employment conditions that
are more directly related to his own personal unemployment rate—that is, the probability
he will become unemployed. However, there is a tradeoff between sampling variance and
sampling bias. At one extreme is an individual’s own unemployment status, which measures
an individual’s exact quantity of interest—their own probability of being unemployed under
the incumbent—but with a small sample size that results in a large amount of sampling
error. At the other extreme is the national unemployment rate, which is drawn from a large
enough sample to essentially eliminate sampling error, but pools an individual’s personal
unemployment rate of interest with the rates of everyone else.
An individual prefers information that is somewhere between the national and the per-
sonal level. This information has lower sampling variance than personal information, and
lower sampling bias than national information. Moreover, information about an individ-
ual’s mecro-economy is essentially free. Local information arrises as a by-product of an
individual’s everyday interactions in his or her home, neighborhood, and workplace.
Together, the above implies that individuals will have different information, and hence
perceptions, about the state of the economy that will, on average, reflect the situation in an
individual’s mecro-economies. These differing perceptions will lead to different vote choices.
For example, if members of an individual’s family, neighborhood, profession and other social
circles all have jobs, he will conclude that his personal unemployment rate is low under
the incumbent, and vote to retain her. In contrast, if many members of an individual’s
family, neighborhood, profession and other social circles are jobless, he will conclude that
his personal unemployment rate is high under the incumbent, and vote for the opposition.
Note that the same predictions would hold if voters were sociotropic: that is, if they
datasets, unemployment is the strongest predictor of election outcomes in the U.S. (Kiewiet and Udell,
1998). Further, employment and unemployment are directly experienced by individuals, their friends, and
their neighbors. Indeed, it is likely easier to observe whether or not your neighbor is employed, which is
informative of unemployment, than it is to gauge the size of a raise he or she may or may not have re-
ceived, which is informative of economic growth. Finally, unlike economic growth, unemployment is often
tabulated by demographic group, allowing us to directly test whether groups that experience higher rates of
unemployment have systematically different economic perceptions and political preferences.
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wanted to vote for the candidate that is best for the aggregate economy. Unless sociotropic
voters expend costly effort to become fully informed about the state of the aggregate econ-
omy, there will still be heterogeneity in these perceptions. Moreover, this heterogeneity will
relate to individual’s own economic circumstances. Thus, observing that individuals’ own
economic circumstances relate to voting behavior is not necessarily evidence of egotropic
voting. However, we maintain the assumption of egotropic motivations as previous scholars
find it preferable due to its simplicity, and to show, in the next section, that it produces
patterns similar to sociotropic motivations.12
3 A Prediction: Sociotropic Voting
Here we show that the theory above produces patterns that resemble the empirical regu-
larity of sociotropic voting: individuals vote largely on the basis of general, rather than
personal, economic conditions. This result may seem counter-intuitive, as mecro-economic
voting centers on the individual’s attempt to understand his or her personal economic cir-
cumstances. However, it follows from the fact that general trends provide more information
about an individual’s personal unemployment rate than does the single observation of an
individual’s current employment status. This section sketches an argument made formally
in the appendix.
Consider an individual who is planning for the next year, and will use information he
gathers in the course of economic planning to inform his vote. Under standard assumptions,
individuals will want to save against the possibility of becoming unemployed in the future.
In order to appropriately save, individuals gather information to estimate their personal
unemployment rate, that is, the probability they will become unemployed the following year.
To the extent that this personal unemployment rate is tied to the incumbent’s economic
12Additionally, our empirical results could also be rationalized by voters who are concerned with the well
being of others in their mecro-economy. However, two findings cast doubt on this interpretation. First, our
study finds differences in perceptions that are correlated with groups such as age and state which are not
generally thought to be the basis of group-based preferences. Secondly, previous research finds that voters
do not vote on group-based perceptions (Kinder, Adams and Gronke, 1989; Mutz and Mondak, 1997).
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policies, this information will also be useful in deciding for whom to vote.
In the tradition of citizen-candidate models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and
Coate, 1997), the policies of both the incumbent and challenger are fixed and known. In
accordance with the findings in Alvarez and Brehm (2002), the effects of those policies on an
individual’s personal unemployment rate are unknown. Thus, current economic information
is useful to an individual trying to infer his personal unemployment rate under the incumbent.
For concreteness, assume that an individual can have a personal unemployment rate that is
either 10% (high) or 5% (low). Suppose further that before a politician is elected, there is
a 50% chance that her economic policies will cause the individual to have a high personal
unemployment rate.
In the model, there are two potential sources of information about an individual’s personal
unemployment rate: his current employment status, and the unemployment rate of people
who are similar to him. However, personal unemployment status is much less informative
than the unemployment rate of people who are similar to him. If an individual is unemployed,
then he will believe there is a 67% chance that the incumbent’s economic policies have
resulted in a high unemployment rate for him. But, if 5% of people that are similar to him
are unemployed, he will be nearly certain that the incumbent’s policies have induced a low
personal unemployment rate. Moreover, note that if the individual is employed, there is only
a 51% chance that the incumbent’s economic policies have resulted in a low unemployment
rate. Thus, when an individual is employed, the unemployment rate of people similar to him
will be even more valuable.
Obviously, if an individual could observe a large number of people who were exactly like
him, he would have a perfect signal of his personal unemployment rate. However, generally
one can only observe a limited number of individuals, who are not exactly the same. That
is, he can observe the unemployment rate in his mecro-economy.
How highly correlated must an individual’s mecro-economic and personal unemployment
rate be for the individual to ignore his personal employment status? As shown in the
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appendix, these rates must have a correlation greater than 1
3
.
Is it reasonable that the correlation between the individual’s mecro-economic and personal
unemployment rates have a correlation greater than 1
3
? As a proxy, the correlation in annual
unemployment rates between the U.S. average and any state, over the period from 1976 to
2008, is greater than 2
3
for all states but Wyoming, where the correlation is 0.44. Therefore,
it is likely that any relevant unemployment rate has a sufficiently high correlation to warrant
individuals ignoring their personal employment status.13
The implication of this simple example is quite similar to sociotropic voting—individuals’
evaluations of general economic trends are more predictive of vote choice than reports of
personal economic circumstances. This does not occur because of altruism, but because
group level information is a powerful signal of whether or not the incumbent’s economic
policies are good for the individual.
4 Evidence from Time-Series Data
The theory of mecro-economic voting predicts that economic perceptions, evaluations, and
political behavior should vary with local economic conditions. Yet, this is counter to many
previous studies of aggregate time-series data which find no relationship between local condi-
tions and evaluations or vote choice (Strumpf and Phillippe, 1999; Eisenberg and Ketcham,
2004). However, the absence of evidence here is not evidence of absence: local conditions are
highly correlated with national conditions, implying that statistical power will be an issue
with the small datasets used. By constructing longer time series, we are able to identify
independent effects of local conditions on economic evaluations and political support.
Moreover, studies focusing on specific elections have found mixed evidence about the
relationship between state economic conditions and presidential candidates’ vote shares.
13An individual’s employment status may still be useful information. When a individual cannot directly
observe unemployment rates, being unemployed is a signal that the individual’s personal unemployment rate
is high. As shown in the next section, unemployed individuals do indeed perceive the unemployment rate is
higher.
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Abrams and Butkiewicz (1995) finds that changes in state-level unemployment and income
growth are correlated with Bush’s vote share in 1992. Abrams (1980) finds similar patterns
in 1956, but only limited evidence that local economic conditions relate to Nixon’s vote share
in 1972. Lacombe and Shaughnessy (2007) finds Bush’s vote share was higher in counties
with lower unemployment rates in 2004. In contrast, Brunk and Gough (1983) finds that
Carter’s vote share was significantly better in states with high unemployment in 1980. These
mixed findings are consistent with more Republican areas having lower unemployment, and
point to the importance of controlling for state level effects across time, as we do in our
analysis.
In particular, we analyze how state unemployment rates correlate with retrospective eco-
nomic evaluations and presidential approval within a state, after controlling for national
trends. We focus on states for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoreti-
cal prospective, monthly state unemployment rates are reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and widely disseminated by the media, making them an easily available piece
of mecro-economic information. From a practical prospective, state is the only geographic
variable consistently reported in all of the data sources we use. There are also disadvantages
to focusing on states, namely, state unemployment is less correlated with a voter’s personal
unemployment rate than local information.14 To the extent that this is true, this will create
noise, making it more difficult for us to find an effect of state unemployment on economic
evaluations and presidential support.
We first examine the standard national retrospective economic evaluation from the Amer-
ican National Election Survey (ANES), which asks:15
Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that
over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten much better, somewhat better,
stayed about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse?
14Reeves and Gimpel (2011) find more disaggregated measures of regional unemployment exhibit a stronger
correlation with economic evaluations than the state unemployment rate in 2008.
15In order to maintain consistency with Section 5 we would prefer to also be able to examine unemployment
perceptions across time. However, data on unemployment perceptions is extremely limited.
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This question was asked from 1980 to 2008, with the exception of 2006.16
Mecro-economic voting theory predicts that respondents in states with higher unemploy-
ment rates, or states where unemployment increased dramatically in the past 12 months,
will report relatively worse national retrospective evaluations than respondents in states with
low levels of unemployment. Table 1 shows this is the case. The first column shows that
the most important correlate of differences in national retrospective economic evaluations
across time is the previous year’s change in the national unemployment rate. However, state
unemployment rates, and the one year change in those rates, are also related to differences
in retrospective economic evaluations. In the second column, we replace the national un-
employment measures with year fixed effects. The results in this column are qualitatively
similar, but with smaller standard errors.
A concern with the specifications in columns 1 and 2 is that some states may have
chronically higher unemployment, and respondents in that state may generally be pessimistic
about the economy for non-economic reasons. Such concerns also plague previous works that
finds association between local economic conditions and national economic assessments in a
specific cross-section (Weatherford, 1983b; Books and Prysby, 1999; Lewis-Beck, 2006; Reeves
and Gimpel, 2011). To address this concern, we exploit the panel structure of our data and
include state fixed effects in column three. Once again, both the level and change in the
state unemployment rate are significantly correlated with national retrospective economic
evaluations. The coefficients imply that independent variation in state unemployment rates
has about 25% of the effect of similar variations in the national unemployment rate.
A final concern is that state-level conditions are a poor proxy for the mecro-economies
that individuals pay attention to. To address this concern, we repeat the specifications
in columns 1 through 3 for respondents’ personal retrospective economic evaluations. The
patterns are much the same as national economic evaluations, suggesting that it is reasonable
to focus on state-level conditions.
16The 2006 ANES used a 3 point scale, rather than a 5 point scale, and hence, is not directly comparable.
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Table 1: State unemployment is correlated with national retrospective economic evaluations,
even when controlling for national trends.
Dependent Variable:
National Retrospective Economic Personal Retrospective Economic
Evaluation in State (ANES) Evaluation in State (ANES)
(1 = Much Worse, 5 = Much Better)
State -0.020∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
Unemployment Rate (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018)
∆ State -0.033 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.042∗ -0.026
Unemployment Rate (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
National -0.046 -0.012
Unemployment Rate (0.087) (0.033)
∆ National -0.27∗∗∗ -0.11∗
Unemployment Rate (0.060) (0.052)
Constant 2.96∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ -2.56∗∗∗ -2.86∗∗∗ -2.52∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.05) (0.08) (0.25) (0.092) (0.13)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with robust standard errors
clustered by year in column 1 and 4, state in columns 2, 3, 5, 6. Each regression implemented via OLS
regressions with 497 state x year observations. Personal retrospective economic evaluations are measured on
a 3-point scale, for comparability with national retrospective evaluations, we re-scale this to a 5-point scale.
We believe we are the first to document an independent effect of state economic conditions
on national economic evaluations across time. Previous studies find national retrospective
economic evaluations are correlated with national economic conditions across time (for ex-
ample: Clarke and Stewart, 1994; Haller and Norpoth, 1994, 1997), a finding we replicate,
and substantively add to.
Next, we examine the extent to which state unemployment affects political support.
Specifically, we relate levels of, and one-year changes in, state unemployment rates to pres-
idential approval. To do so, we capture every Gallup poll on the Roper Center Web site
between 1980–2008 that reported presidential approval and the state of residence for each
respondent. We use these polls, 745 in all, to construct monthly presidential approval rates
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for each state. These approval rates are regressed on unemployment rates in Table 2.17
Table 2: State unemployment rates are correlated with presidential support.
Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval (Gallup)
(100 = 100% approval, -100 = 100% disapproval)
National Unemployment Rate -6.44∗∗∗
(1.27)
∆ National Unemployment Rate 0.79
(1.71)
State Unemployment Rate -1.22 -1.16∗∗∗
(1.20) (0.41)
∆ State Unemployment Rate 0.08
(1.81)
State Unemployment:
Under Reagan -1.03
(0.75)
Under Bush (I) -1.50∗∗∗
(0.39)
Under Clinton -0.97
(0.65)
Under Bush (II) -1.36∗∗
(0.65)
Month X Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
State X President Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Month Observations 15,304 15,304 15,304 Varies
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the state level (51 clusters). All specifications are implemented via OLS
regressions. Column 4 contains the results of 4 separate regressions, one for each Presidency.
Table 2 shows that a one percent increase in the national unemployment rate is associated
with a roughly three percentage point decrease in presidential approval.18 Controlling for
17The ANES does not have vote choice in non-presidential election years, but we can construct an indi-
cator of presidential approval from these data using party thermometer ratings. Unfortunately, due to the
need to cluster standard errors, this does not provide enough power to examine the relationship between
unemployment rates and party support. In particular, the standard errors are quite large, which has likely
prevented previous studies from finding a statistically significant correlation between presidential support
and local economic conditions.
18The dependent variable in this analysis is the average approval in state where approving equals 100,
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national trends, an additional one percentage point state-level increase in unemployment
is associated with roughly a 0.6 percentage point decrease in approval. Thus, similar to
the results in Table 1, the independent correlation between state-level unemployment and
approval is roughly 20% of the national-level correlation. Note also that the correlation
between state unemployment and presidential approval is relatively consistent across all four
presidencies we examine.
While there are many studies that find an effect of state economic performance on guber-
natorial popularity and votes (for example: Hansen, 1999; Wolfers, 2002; Cohen and King,
2004), we believe we are the first to document an independent effect of state unemployment
on presidential approval. In particular, these findings contrast with those that find contradic-
tory results about the effect of local economic conditions in single elections (Abrams, 1980;
Brunk and Gough, 1983; Abrams and Butkiewicz, 1995; Lacombe and Shaughnessy, 2007).
The panel structure of our data allows us to control for persistent differences in partisanship
across states. Moreover, this contrasts with previous studies that have found no effect of
state unemployment on presidential vote share (Strumpf and Phillippe, 1999; Eisenberg and
Ketcham, 2004) across time. Prior studies are hampered by the small sample size imposed by
using vote shares over the relatively short period where disaggregated unemployment data
is available. Our data provide greater statistical power to tease out the relative importance
of national versus state economic conditions.
The two new stylized facts identified in Tables 1 and 2 support mecro-economic voting
theory. However, the theory focuses on economic perceptions, which are largely unmeasured
in time-series data. Thus, we turn to cross-sectional data on a specially designed survey
question in order to more fully understand the extent to which economic perceptions match
with those predicted by mecro-economic voting.
disapproving equals -100, and neither approving or disapproving equals zero. Under this coding scheme, a
coefficient of six corresponds to a three percentage point change in approval. This point estimate here is
quite similar to that in Mueller’s (1970) seminal study of the effect of national unemployment on presidential
approval from 1945 to 1968.
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5 Cross-sectional Evidence
The results in this section are concerned with individuals’ perceptions of the national un-
employment rate. However, before turning to these results, we must fill in the step between
individuals’ perceptions of their mecro-economy and those of the macro-economy.
As local information is more relevant to economic planning and less costly to gather,
mecro-economic voting predicts that most of the information a voter has is from their mecro-
economy. Because local and national conditions are positively correlated, we expect that in-
dividuals observing worse local conditions will rationally perceive that the national economy
is worse. As a result, those observing higher local unemployment will report higher national
unemployment rates.19 Of course, it is unlikely that no-one in our sample knows the national
unemployment rate, and, moreover, that this knowledge will vary with an individual’s media
environment. Thus, in Section 5.2 we use variation in exposure to media as a further test of
mecro-economic voting theory.20
5.1 Unemployment Perceptions
The results discussed in this section concern the following question asked of 3000 respondents
to the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES):
The unemployment rate in the U.S. has varied between 2.5% and 10.8% between
1948 and today. The average unemployment rate during that time was 5.8%.
As far as you know, what is the current rate of unemployment? That is, of the
adults in the US who wanted to work during the second week of October, what
percent of them would you guess were unemployed and looking for a job?
19This behavior is similar to the anchoring or availability bias documented in Kahneman and Tversky
(1974) but is also consistent with the bayesian model used in the appendix.
20The idea that individuals have different costs of learning information is reflected in many public opinion
studies, for example: Alvarez and Franklin (1994); Alvarez (1997); Bartels (1986); Luskin (1987); Zaller
(1992); and Zaller and Feldman (1992). Moreover, about half of the U.S. public admits to not getting any
economic news (Haller and Norpoth, 1997).
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Figure 1 displays the general pattern in the data: groups that experience more unem-
ployment report, on average, higher unemployment rates. This is true whether the average
is measured according to the median or mean. Note that in order to prevent unusually high
responses from driving differences in the mean, we top code responses at 25% throughout.21
While Figure 1 is consistent with the pattern predicted by theory, one might worry
that these perceptions are driven by other factors, such as partisanship. Focusing on age:
perhaps younger people are more liberal, and the more liberal a person is, the higher he
or she perceives unemployment to be. While it is unlikely that we could establish a causal
relationship between a person’s mecro-economic environment and his or her perception of
unemployment rates, we can certainly control for observable correlates in more complete
regression analyses.
Table 3 presents exactly these analyses. The second and fourth columns contain OLS
specifications. The coefficient on an attribute can be seen as the difference between the mean
reported unemployment rate for respondents with that attribute and a baseline, controlling
for observable characteristics. Columns 1 and 3 contain a least absolute difference (LAD)
specification, often referred to as a median regression. That is, the coefficient on an attribute
can be seen as the difference between the median reported unemployment rate for respondents
with that attribute and a baseline, controlling for observable characteristics. Consistent with
Figure 1, the OLS coefficients (difference between means by group) are greater than the LAD
coefficients (difference between medians by group).
The first pair of specifications in Table 3 differ from the second pair only in how they treat
location. The first two columns contain state fixed effects, consistent with the specification
for all other attributes. In both specifications, these state-by-state dummies are jointly
statistically significant. However, it is possible that this correlation results from respondents
in states with lower unemployment rates reporting higher unemployment rates, contrary to
21This affects 6.3% of respondents. Top coding at 15% through 50% (or just dropping observations over
that level) produces qualitatively similar results. In general, the greater the value at which top coding begins,
the more pronounced the differences between groups.
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Figure 1: Reported unemployment rates increase as the true unemployment rate of a group
increases.
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the predicted patterns. To examine this possibility, the second pair of columns include each
state’s unemployment rate, rather than state fixed effects, in the regression.22
The coefficients in Table 3 generally agree with the patterns in Figure 1: groups that
experience more unemployment report, on average, higher unemployment rates. This can be
seen by comparing the coefficients in Table 3 with Table 4, which contains unemployment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for October, 2008. However, there are two
notable deviations: even though both women and married men had lower unemployment
rates than unmarried men, they perceive higher unemployment rates.
Women may report higher unemployment rates because they participate in the labor
force at a lower rate, as shown in Table 4. In most cases, groups with higher labor force
non-participation are more likely to be unemployed. This is not the case for women. To
the extent that the unemployment rate does not accurately reflect discouraged workers, it
may be that women perceive a higher unemployment rate because their peer group includes
many discouraged workers. While the BLS would view these women as being labor force
non-participants, respondents may classify them as unemployed.23
Despite the fact that the BLS does not provide labor force participation by marital status,
it seems likely that married men have a higher labor force participation rate then unmarried
men. Why then do married men report higher unemployment rates than unmarried men?
A potential answer comes from the literature on international political economy (IPE). IPE
studies show that married men are more likely to favor protectionist trade policies, and
scholars attribute this to married men having more economic anxiety.24 While anxiety
about the economy may lead married men to exaggerate the unemployment rate as well
as the threat of free trade, it seems more appropriate here to simply note that married men
22Including variables that change only at a group level may bias standard errors. To mitigate this issue,
we use robust standard errors clustered at the state level in the OLS specification, and standard errors block
bootstrapped at the state level for the LAD specification.
23Note that the BLS tracks several alternative measures of unemployment, some of which try to account
for discouraged and underemployed workers (especially their U-6 measure). Unfortunately, we have not
found these statistics broken down by gender. Moreover, while perceptions of unemployment by occupation
or sector would likely be of great interest (Rehm, 2009, forthcoming), the CCES does not contain such data.
24See, for example, Hiscox (2006). We thank Stephanie Rickard for pointing this out.
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Table 3: Correlates of Reported Unemployment (CCES, N = 2,875)
Democrat 0.56∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.22) (0.08) (0.25)
Independent 0.33∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.20) (0.08) (0.18)
Age 18–24 0.90∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.55) (0.15) (0.55)
Age 25–44 0.52∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.24) (0.09) (0.25)
Age 45–64 0.18∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.20) (0.08) (0.17)
Married Male 0.23∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.22) (0.09) (0.16)
Unmarried Female 0.72∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.33) (0.10) (0.37)
Married Female 0.64∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.27) (0.09) (0.20)
African American 0.58∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.40) (0.10) (0.39)
Hispanic -0.01 0.96∗∗∗ 0.10 1.01∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.37) (0.11) (0.35)
Some College -0.23∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.23) (0.07) (0.26)
BA Degree -0.30∗∗∗ -1.54∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -1.56∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.21) (0.08) (0.26)
Income < $20,000 0.92∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.49) (0.14) (0.52)
$20,000 < Income < $40,000 0.49∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.31) (0.11) (0.30)
$40,000 < Income < $80,000 0.06 0.41∗ 0.07 0.35∗
(0.07) (0.23) (0.10) (0.20)
$80,000 < Income < $120,000 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.12
(0.07) (0.25) (0.11) (0.27)
Unemployed 0.20 1.15∗∗ 0.14 1.23∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.49) (0.12) (0.45)
State Dummies F = 22.5 F = 1.39
p = 0.00 p = 0.04
State Unemployment Rate 0.11∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.02) (0.07)
Constant 5.48∗∗∗ 5.65∗∗∗ 5.04∗∗∗ 4.41∗∗∗
(0.83) (1.13) (0.22) (0.61)
Regression Type LAD OLS LAD OLS
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with robust standard
errors in parenthesis for OLS and bootstrapped (or block-bootstrapped) standard errors for
LAD. Standard errors are clustered at the state level when state unemployment is included.
Regressions also include minor and missing party, church attendance, union membership, and
missing income indicators. The omitted categories are white for race, unmarried men, 65+ for
age, 12 years or less of education, and $120,000+ for income. 21
Table 4: Unemployment and labor force non-participation rates in 2008, by group.
Labor
Unemployment Force
Rate Non-Participation
National Average: 5.8% 34.0%
Age:
18–24: 11.6% 31.3%
25–44: 5.2% 16.3%
45–64: 4.0% 25.6%
65+: 4.2 % 83.2%
Rate or Ethnicity:
White: 5.2% 33.7%
Hispanic: 7.6% 31.5%
African American: 10.1% 36.3%
Education:
High School or Less: 6.5% 42.2%
Some College: 4.6% 28.2%
College Degree and Postgraduate: 2.6% 22.2%
Gender:
Male: 6.1% 27.0%
Female: 5.4 % 40.5%
Marital Status:
Never Married:
Male: 11.0% N/A
Female: 8.5% N/A
Married:
Male: 3.4% N/A
Female: 3.6% N/A
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
report unemployment rates inconsistent with theory.
While the results in Table 3 are consistent with respondents basing perceptions of the
unemployment rate on information from their mecro-economies, two covariates in Table 3
provide the most direct evidence that respondents are using information from their sur-
roundings. First, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, a higher unemployment rate in a
state is associated with a higher reported unemployment rate. Second, an individual’s own
22
unemployment status is associated with a higher reported unemployment rate.25
5.2 Media Use and Perceptions
Mecro-economic voting specifies that differences in national economic perceptions are based
on differences in information. This will be affected by differences in media use, which makes
information, in addition to that from an individual’s mecro-economies, freely available. We
leverage this fact to conduct two further tests that examine how access to information affect
respondents’ economic perceptions.
We expect that voters will report common perceptions of national economic conditions
when information about the aggregate economy is freely available. As national television
news often reports on the national unemployment rate, we expect to observe less hetero-
geneity in unemployment perceptions among those who report watching national television
news. However, as national television news rarely discusses the price of gas, we expect that
heterogeneity in perceptions of gas prices should be largely the same between those that do,
and do not, watch national television news.
Table 5 confirms that these predicted patters exist in the data. In particular, among those
that do not watch national news, different age, educational, income, and ethnic groups show
greater differences in unemployment perceptions than among those that do watch national
news. Such differences do not exist in perceptions of gas prices. As those who do and do
not watch media are different in many ways, we cannot claim that this is a causal effect,
however, it is still supportive of mecro-economic voting theory.
Although perceptions of gas prices do not change with media exposure, they should
change with activities that provide more exposure to gas prices. (Ansolabehere, Meredith
and Snowberg, 2010) show that, controlling for a host of demographic factors, each extra
day per week an respondent drove made his or her reported perceptions 0.8 cents more
accurate. Similarly, each extra per week a respondent reported noticing gas prices induced
25The correlation between partisan identification and unemployment perceptions is explored in An-
solabehere, Meredith and Snowberg (2010).
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Table 5: Correlates of Unemployment and Gas Prices by Media Environment
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Gas Prices
Watch National News? No Yes No YesN = 957 N = 1, 919 N = 962 N = 1, 925
Democrat 0.53∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.56 2.69∗∗
(0.27) (0.08) (2.93) (1.18)
Independent 0.28 0.28∗∗∗ 2.67 2.31∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.07) (2.61) (2.00)
Age 18–24 1.87∗∗ 0.50 10.5 8.83∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.40) (6.6) (3.42)
Age 25–44 0.74∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ -0.77 1.49
(0.21) (0.09) (3.93) (2.81)
Age 45–64 0.16 0.12∗ -4.44 1.14
(0.18) (0.06) (3.57) (1.12)
Married Male 0.24 0.14∗∗ -4.61 -0.72
(0.26) (0.07) (3.18) (1.89)
Unmarried Female 0.76∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ -0.16 2.21
(0.34) (0.10) (2.37) (2.22)
Married Female 0.92∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ -0.31 1.93
(0.27) (0.10) (3.05) (2.03)
African American 1.35∗∗ 0.31 7.97∗ 0.31
(0.62) (0.21) (4.84) (2.72)
Hispanic 0.14 0.01 0.04 6.14∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.12) (3.45) (2.26)
Some College -0.52∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 5.76∗ -0.28
(0.26) (0.07) (3.11) (1.26)
BA Degree -0.80∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 1.35 3.20∗
(0.27) (0.07) (2.62) (1.94)
Income < $20,000 1.42 0.52∗∗∗ -0.47 -0.22
(1.16) (0.17) (5.94) (3.15)
$20,000 < Income < $40,000 0.71∗ 0.28∗∗∗ -3.93 -0.48
(0.38) (0.08) (5.87) (2.18)
$40,000 < Income < $80,000 0.22 0.06 -5.03 -1.68
(0.22) (0.07) (4.14) (2.07)
$80,000 < Income < $120,000 0.20 0.00 -5.35 -3.82∗∗
(0.27) (0.08) (4.31) (2.01)
Unemployed 1.03 -0.02 8.59∗∗∗ 3.47
(1.01) (0.16) (2.90) (4.31)
State Unemployment Rate 0.09 0.11∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.02)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. LAD specifica-
tions with block-bootstrapped standard errors, blocked at state level, in parenthesis. National
Media sample indicated they watched national TV news, while local did not. Regressions also
include minor and missing party, church attendance, union membership, and missing income
indicators. The omitted categories are white for race, unmarried men, 65+ for age, 12 years
or less of education, and $120,000+ for income.
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an independent 1.6 cent increase in accuracy. To put this another way, controlling for other
factors, a respondent who drove to work and noticed gas prices five days a week would be 12
cents more accurate than the average respondent. Given that the mean difference between
reported and actual gas prices was about 20 cents, this implies that people who drive and
notice gas prices on their way to work are 60% more accurate in their perception of the
average price of gas.26
6 Unemployment Perceptions and Vote Choice
We expect, based on the theory in Section 2, that the higher a respondent’s reported unem-
ployment level, the more likely he or she will be to vote for the candidate from the opposition
party, the Democrats. While the fact that this prediction holds is not particularly surprising,
it is still important to carry our analysis of cross-sectional data through to political support.
We regress an indicator variable coded one if the respondent indicated he or she voted for
Barak Obama, the Democratic candidate, and zero if he or she voted for John McCain, the
Republican candidate, on reported unemployment and a host of controls in Table 6.27 Mecro-
economic voting predicts that the coefficient on reported unemployment will be positive.
The first column of Table 6 shows that reported unemployment is significantly correlated
with vote choice. However, as shown in Table 3, unemployment perceptions are correlated
with partisan leanings. In order to control for this, we enter dummy variables for each point
of a seven-point party identification scale in the second column. Reported unemployment is
still significantly related to vote choice, but the coefficient is smaller.
What other controls should be included in the regression? According to the theory above,
demographic factors are proxies for different economic experiences and local conditions, that,
in turn, cause individuals to have different perceptions. However, at the same time, demo-
26Consistent with attributional theories discussed in the introduction, everyday interactions may also affect
preferences: Egan and Mullin (2010) find that local weather conditions affect individuals’ feelings about
the importance of policies aimed at curbing global warming. However, as mentioned in the introduction,
attributional theories largely ignore the role of information and perception.
27Sample sizes are smaller as those who reported not voting were not included in the analysis.
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Table 6: Vote choice is correlated with unemployment perceptions.
Dependent Variable: Vote for Obama = 1, Vote for McCain = 0 (CCES, N=2,026)
Reported Unemployment 0.017∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Reported Unemployment 0.06∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗
(Report In Frame) (0.01) (0.006) (0.006)
Below Frame 0.31 0.26 0.19
(0.20) (0.20) (0.16)
Above Frame 0.60∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant 0.40∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.10 0.11∗ -0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10)
Party Identification
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(7 dummy variables)
All Other Controls
No No Yes No No Yes
(From Table 3)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level with robust standard
errors in parenthesis. All specifications are implemented via OLS regressions.
graphic factors may have a direct effect on voting. Thus, although including demographic
controls will absorb much of the effect predicted by theory, they are necessary to avoid omit-
ted variable bias. The third column of Table 3 includes all our demographic controls in the
regression, and the coefficient on reported unemployment shrinks, as expected.
It is likely that respondents who reported an unemployment rate above or below the
historical unemployment rates, given in the survey question, were either not paying par-
ticular attention to the survey instrument, or have economic perceptions that significantly
diverge from the average respondent. Therefore, columns four through six group together
respondents who reported a level of unemployment above or below the range of historical
values—that is below 2.5% or above 10.8%, which we refer to in the table as the frame.28 For
28The reported unemployment rate of those above and below the frame is coded as zero in Table 6.
We could also drop these respondents from the analysis—this produces similar results. We maintain all
respondents, as, in October 2008, there were areas (and groups) for which the unemployment rate was well
above the historical high of the national rate, and thus, even a respondent paying close attention to the
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those respondents who reported a level between 2.5% and 10.8%, reported unemployment
enters the specification linearly, as in the first three columns.
In our preferred specification, column five of Table 6, an increase in perceived unemploy-
ment from the rate for college graduates (2.6%) to 15% (the rate in various areas of the
rust belt in October 2008) results in a 15 percentage point increase in the probability that
a respondent voted for Obama.29 Thus, those respondents who believe that the unemploy-
ment rate is higher also were significantly more likely to vote against the incumbent party,
as predicted.
7 Discussion: The Shifting Nature of Economic Voting
We have shown that perceptions of macro-economic conditions are correlated with mecro-
economic conditions. Specifically, both aggregate retrospective economic evaluations from
the ANES, and state-level presidential support from Gallup, vary with state unemployment
rates after controlling for national trends. Moreover, data from the CCES shows that indi-
viduals who are members of groups that are more likely to be unemployed perceive higher
unemployment rates, and are more likely to vote for presidential challengers. Thus, as voters
are influenced by their mecro-economies, vote patterns are affected by the structure of the
economy. This has particularly important implications for election forecasting.
The U.S. economy has changed in many ways since the inaugural studies of economic
survey may report a high unemployment rate.
29A one standard-deviation change in unemployment perceptions in this specification is associated with
a six percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Obama, which is the same as the standard
deviation of two-party vote in the postwar period. Probit or logit specifications produce qualitatively similar
results, but stronger support for mecro-economic voting. That is, the coefficients on reported unemployment
are statistically significant at greater levels, and the marginal effects of a change in perceptions are larger.
We present OLS estimates as they are qualitatively similar and easier to interpret.
Up until this point, we have assumed a linear relationship between reported unemployment rate and
vote choice. However, there is no particular reason to believe that the relationship should be linear. A
quadratic specification gives a similar magnitude for the relationship between reported unemployment and
vote choice, and is statistically significant at the 95% level when including additional controls such as
ideology. Regressing unemployment on dummy variables for each percent of reported unemployment (24
dummy variables) and running a joint F-test produces a generally increasing likelihood of voting for Obama
as reported unemployment increases, and the coefficients are jointly significant at p = 0.0000.
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voting in the early 1970s. In particular, industries such as steel and auto manufacturing have
shrunk in both relative and absolute size, and services have become a much larger part of
the economy. Thus, an election forecasting model based on the pattern of economic voting
in the 1970s might be out of date by the mid-2000s. In general, forecasting models may
incorrectly predict support for the incumbent party, and the size of the error will depend
on both the size of the relative groups, which may shift across time, and the unemployment
rate of those groups. This is consistent with the fact that vote share is sometimes several
standard deviations away from the predictions of economic voting models. For example, the
original Fair (1978) economic voting model, which is based on macro-economic variables,
was updated many times in order to produce more accurate estimates. Even so, in 2004, this
model produced results that were off by as much as four standard deviations (Fair, 2006).30
This brings us back to the Kramer (1983) critique of using individual level data to un-
derstand economic voting. Kramer maintained that variation in individual level responses
to survey questions were largely noise, and thus, were either uninformative about, or pro-
duced biased understandings of, the mechanisms underlying economic voting. Our findings
challenge this critique in two ways. First, we have shown that individuals’ reports of eco-
nomic perceptions seem to incorporate real information about their economic conditions.
Moreover, we have verified this finding using aggregate data. Second, economic perceptions
are associated with differences in political support in both individual and aggregate data.
This turns the Kramer critique on its head: ignoring individuals’ economic perceptions and,
instead, using only macro-economic data, runs the risk of creating a biased understanding
of economic voting.
30Note that at least one standard deviation may be due to the Iraq War, see Karol and Miguel (2008).
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Appendix
A.1 Formalization of Sections 2 and 3
Here we consider a two period model where a continuum of individuals seek information in
order to make optimal savings decisions. Each individual uses information revealed in this
process about the effects of an incumbent politician’s economic policies to inform his sincere
vote. In the second period, each individual consumes his wages and savings: no choices are
made. The fact that there is a continuum of individuals, and employment and unemployment
are determined only by the policies of the incumbent politician in each period, means that
we can focus on the decision problems of a single individual, taking the decision of all other
individuals as given.
Consider an individual with a per period utility of consumption given by u(·), which is
continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. At the beginning of the first period the
individual may be employed at a wage w, and is endowed with some amount ε ≥ w, and.
The individual saves an amount s from the first to the second period. His total expected
utility if he is employed in the first period, as a function of the unemployment rate in the
second period R ∈ (0, 1) is given by
U(s|R) = u(ε+ w − s) +Ru(s) + (1−R)u(w + s)
Fact 1 The optimal savings rate s∗ is in the interval
(
0, ε+w
2
)
if the individual is employed
in the first period, and
(
0, ε
2
)
if unemployed. s∗ is increasing in R.
We follow the citizen-candidate tradition in assuming that each politician’s policies are
known and fixed. However, we add a slight twist in that the effects of these policies on each
individual is unknown. Specifically, the individual’s personal unemployment rate R ∈ {L,H}
is either low L, or high, H, with L < H and L + H < 1. Although the individual votes
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sincerely in the election, he knows he is not pivotal, and takes the probability that the
incumbent will be reelected as some exogenous probability ξ.
The individual believes each politician’s economic policies have a prior probability pi of
generating a high unemployment rate for him. He also witnesses two imperfect signals of
his personal unemployment rate under the incumbent politician, his personal employment
situation, σE ∈ {0, 1}—equal to zero if he is unemployed, and one if employed—and the
unemployment rate σRi ∈ {0, 1} in his mecro-economy, where one indicates a high unem-
ployment rate, and zero a low unemployment rate. Signals are correlated with personal
unemployment rates in the following way: P (σRi =0|R=L) = ρ = P (σRi =1|R=H), where
ρ > 1
2
.31 The probability an individual is employed if his personal unemployment rate is
high, P (σE =1|R= H), is 1−H, and so on.
Defining pi(σ) as the posterior probability the individual’s personal unemployment rate
is high given signal σ, and redefining signal realizations so H is the realization that results
in a higher posterior probability and L is the one resulting in a lower posterior, we have:
Definition 1 We say signal j is more precise than signal k if:
pi(σj =H) ≥ pi(σk=H) ≥ pi(σk=L) ≥ pi(σj =L)
Thus, a binary signal is more precise than another if either realization of the signal results
in greater certainty of the underlying state. Note that this is not a strict ordering, as some
signals may produce more certainty than another with a high realization, but less certainty
with a low realization.
Proposition 1 More precise signals are more valuable.
31This implies
Corr(R, σRi) = (2ρ− 1)
√
pi(1− pi)
pii(1− pii)
where pii = P (σRi = 0) = piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ).
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Returning to the particulars of our model, we make a simple assumption on the param-
eters of the signaling structure:
Assumption 1 We assume that
ρ >
H
L+H
. (1)
Using personal unemployment rates of H = 10% and L = 5%, this means that (1) holds
when ρ > 2
3
. That is to say, employment status is a less precise signal than knowing 10% of
your profession is unemployed if, when 10% of your profession is unemployed, there is greater
than a two-thirds chance that you will also become unemployed with 10% probability. We
believe this is reasonable and assume it throughout.
Fact 2 When (1) holds, then σRi is more precise than σE.
While the individual will observe σE, they will likely have to seek out σRi . This last fact
tells us that as long as the cost of seeking out σRi is low, the individual will do so. Moreover,
to the extent that the national unemployment rate is less precise than a mecro-economic
unemployment rate, fewer individuals will seek out this signal at the same cost.
The individual can thus use both his personal employment status σE and the unemploy-
ment rate of his mecro-economy σRi to inform his (sincere) vote. If both the mecro-economic
unemployment rate is low and the individual is employed, it is straightforward to show he
will vote for the incumbent. This occurs because the individual’s posterior belief that the
incumbent’s policies are good for him will be greater than pi, the probability that a chal-
lenger’s economic policies are good for him. Likewise, if the individual is both unemployed
and the mecro-economic unemployment rate is high, then the individual will vote for the
challenger.
To determine how the individual will vote when they are employed, but the unemployment
rate is high is more subtle. Specifically, it requires knowledge of the probability that both
signals have a given realization when the incumbent’s policies are either good or bad. While
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there are a variety of ways to structure these probabilities, we assume that the signals are
conditionally independent, which can hold if the individual is a very small part of his mecro-
economy. That is, P (σE =e ∩ σRi =r|R) = P (σE =e|R) ∗ P (σRi =r|R).
Proposition 2 If ρ > 1−L
2−L−H , then an individual’s vote choice will be determined by his
mecro-economic unemployment rate when he is employed, but his employment status when
he is unemployed. If ρ > H
L+H
, as in (1), then an individual’s vote choice will always be
determined by his mecro-economic unemployment rate.
The proposition holds because being employed is an extremely weak signal that the
incumbent’s economic policies are good for the individual, and so it is easily outweighed by
the better signal of the unemployment rate in the individual’s mecro-economy.
As we argue in the text, some individuals will choose to become informed about the
national unemployment rate in addition to their mecro-economic unemployment rate. This
could be formalized here by assuming that each person has a cost of acquiring information
that is an i.i.d. draw from some distribution. As argued in the text, an individual’s mecro-
economic unemployment rate is a more precise signal than the national unemployment rate,
so this would mean that there is some subset of people who would pay the cost to acquire
information about the national unemployment rate, but this group of people would be smaller
than those who acquire information about their mecro-economic unemployment rate. Thus,
we do not formalize this here as the implications are straight-forward, and it would require
substantially more notation.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Fact 1: Note that:
dU(s|R)
ds
= −u′(ε+ IEw − s) +Ru′(s) + (1−R)u′(w + s) (2)
d2U(s|R)
ds2
= u′′(ε+ IEw − s) +Ru′′(s) + (1−R)u′′(w + s) < 0 (3)
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where IE is an indicator equal to one if the individual is employed in the first period. As (3)
indicates that U(s|R) is strictly concave, (2) will imply a unique equilibrium level of savings,
s∗. Setting s = 0 and s = ε+ IEw, respectively gives
dU(s|R)
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=0
= −u′(ε+ IEw) +Ru′(0) + (1−R)u′(w)
≥ −u′(w) +Ru′(0) + (1−R)u′(w)
= −R(u′(w)− u′(0)) = −R
∫ w
0
u′′(x)dx > 0
dU(s|R)
ds
∣∣∣∣
s=ε+IEw
= −u′(0) +Ru′(ε+ IEw) + (1−R)u′(ε+ IEw + w)
< −u′(0) + u′(ε+ IEw) =
∫ ε+IEw
0
u′′(x)dx < 0
so s∗ will be in the interior of (0, w). The integral representation follows from the fundamental
theorem of calculus. As (2) defines s∗, we can use implicit function theorem to (via implicit
differentiation) to determine
ds∗
dR
= −
∂
∂R
(
dU(s|R)
ds
)
∂
∂s∗
(
dU(s|R)
ds
) = ∫ w+ss u′′(x)dx
u′′(ε+ IEw − s) +Ru′′(s) + (1−R)u′′(w + s) > 0 (4)
Thus, s∗ is increasing in R, it is maximized when R = 1. When R = 1, s∗ solves
u′(ε+ IEw − s) = u′(s), that is, s∗ = ε+IEw2 . Thus, s∗ ∈
(
0, ε+IEw
2
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Because of the independence property of preferences underlying
the utility representation, we can ignore the exogenous probability 1− ξ that the incumbent
will not be re-elected, as this will proportionally lower the value of all signals. Moreover,
without loss of generality, we can consider the case where ε = 0, and the individual is em-
ployed in the first period (or ε = w, and the agent is unemployed). Recall that the individual
has a prior belief pi that his personal unemployment rate will be high. Recall further that
we defined the signal that results in a higher posterior probability of the individual’s per-
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sonal unemployment rate being high as σ = L, the signal that results in a lower posterior
probability of the individual’s personal unemployment rate being high as σ = H. Here we
denote P = Prob(σ = L).
Voters use Bayesian updating to determine the expected unemployment rate after getting
a signal. Recalling pi(j) ≡ Prob(R=H|σ=j), and using the martingale property of Bayesian
updating, we have that
pi = Ppi(L) + (1− P )pi(H)
which, defining the expected unemployment rate R(j) ≡ (1− pi(j))L+ pi(j)H, as a function
of belief pi(j), implies
R(pi) = PR(L) + (1− P )R(H) (5)
as there is a one-to-one mapping between posterior probabilities and posterior expected
personal unemployment rates, we can think of a signal as having three characteristics, P ,
R(L), and R(H), where, according to (5) any two of these characteristics define the third.
By definition pi(L) < pi < pi(H), which implies R(L) < R(pi) < R(H). Define s∗j as the
optimal level of savings when the individual receives a realized signal σ = j. Using (4) we
have s∗L < s
∗ < s∗H .
An individual values a signal because it allows him to better optimize his savings rate s∗.
The value of a particular realization of the signal can be defined as V (σ=j) = U(s∗j |R(j))−
U(s∗|R(j)). Thus, the total expected value of a signal is
V (σ) = PV (σ = L) + (1− P )V (σ = H). (6)
and we will examine how this value changes with the precision of the signal.
Reframing Definition 1: σ1 is more precise than σ2 if |L− R(σ1 =L)| ≤ |L− R(σ2 =L)|
and |H − R(σ1 =H)| ≤ |H − R(σ2 =H)|, with at least one strict inequality. To determine
if a more precise signal is indeed more valuable, we will examine how the value of the signal
changes with changes in the characteristics of a signal. However, as noted above, changing
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one characteristic of the signal (P , R(L), and R(H)) necessitates a change in at least one of
the other characteristics so that (5) will continue to hold. Thus, we examine the three changes
in pairs of these variables holding the third constant. As any change can be represented by
some combination of these three changes, this is the same as investigating the basis of any
change.32
The first change is to increase the value of R(H), while fixing P . This will require a
compensating decrease in R(L) to maintain the equality in (5). That is
dV (σ)
dR(H)
= P
dV (σ=L)
dR(H)
+ (1− P )dV (σ=H)
dR(H)
= P
[
dU(s∗L|R(L))
dR(L)
− dU(s
∗|R(L))
dR(L)
]
dR(L)
dR(H)
+ (1− P )
[
dU(s∗H |R(H))
dR(H)
− dU(s
∗|R(H))
dR(H)
]
= P
[∫ s∗
s∗L
∫ w
0
u′′(y + x)dy dx
]
dR(L)
dR(H)
+ (1− P )
[
−
∫ s∗H
s∗
∫ w
0
u′′(y + x)dy dx
]
where the second line follows from the chain rule, and
∫ s∗
s∗L
∫ w
0
u′′(y + x)dy dx < 0 due to the
concavity of u. Note that within each square bracket the first derivative is made simpler
by the envelope theorem, and the second is zero as s∗ is fixed. Re-arranging (5) yields
R(L) = R(pi)−(1−P )R(H)
P
, so
dR(L)
dR(H)
=
P − 1
P
< 0, (7)
and thus, dV (σ)
dR(H)
> 0. Note that (7) is negative, as expected.
A second change is to increase P while fixing R(L). This implies an increase in R(H),
32Mathematically, this is a derivative on a three dimensional surface, and the pairwise changes establish
changes along a set of basis vectors. Changes in all three variables simultaneously are combinations of
changes along these basis vectors. For simplicity, we avoid vector calculus notation.
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dR(H)
dP
= R(H)−R(L)
1−P > 0. Now
dV (σ)
dP
= U(s∗L|R(L))− U(s∗|R(L))−
[
U(s∗H |R(H))− U(s∗|R(H))
]
+ (1− P )dV (σ=H)
dR(H)
∗ dR(H)
dP
= u(w − s∗L) +R(L)u(s∗L) + (1−R(L))u(w + s∗L)−(
u(w − s∗H) +R(L)u(s∗H) + (1−R(L))u(w + s∗H)
)
= U(s∗L|R(L))− U(s∗H |R(L)) > 0
where the second line follows from expanding V (·) and U(·) into component u(·) terms, and
canceling, the third line follows from the definition of U(·), and the inequality follows from
the definition of s∗L.
A final change is to increase R(L) while fixing R(H). This implies an increase in P ,
dP
dR(L)
= P
R(H)−R(L) > 0. The effect of this final change is:
dV (σ)
dR(L)
= P
dV (σ=L)
dR(L)
+
(
V (σ=L)− V (σ=H)) dP
dR(L)
=
P
R(H)−R(L)
[
dV (σ= l)
dR(L)
(
R(H)−R(L))+ V (σ=L)− V (σ=H)]
=
P
R(H)−R(L)
[
u(w − s∗L) +R(H)u(s∗L) + (1−R(H))u(w + s∗L)−[
u(w − s∗H) +R(H)u(s∗H) + (1−R(H))u(w + s∗H)
]]
=
P
R(H)−R(L)
[
U(s∗L|R(H))− U(s∗H |R(H))
]
< 0
where, once again, the third line follows from expanding V (·) and U(·) into component u(·)
terms, and canceling, the fourth line follows from the definition of U(·), and the inequality
follows from the definition of s∗H .
Note that in all three of these changes, an decrease in |H − R(H)| or |L − R(L)| is
associated with an increase in the value of the signal. Thus, more precise signals are more
valuable. 
42
Proof of Fact 2: Start by re-writing (1) as the first inequality below:
ρ
1− ρ >
H
L
>
1− L
1−H . (8)
The second inequality follows from the fact that H > L and L+H < 1. We have that
ρ(1− pi)L > H(1− pi)(1− ρ)
piρ(piH + (1− pi)L) > piH(piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ))
pi(σRi =1) =
piρ
piρ+ (1− pi)(1− ρ) >
piH
piH + (1− pi)L = pi(σE =1).
Using the second inequality in (1) we have
ρ(1− pi)(1−H) > (1− ρ)(1− pi)(1− L)
pi(1−H)(pi(1− ρ) + (1− pi)ρ) > pi(1− ρ)(pi(1−H) + (1− pi)(1− L))
pi(σE =0) =
pi(1−H)
pi(1−H) + (1− pi)(1− L) >
pi(1− ρ)
pi(1− ρ) + (1− pi)ρ = pi(σRi =0).
Thus, pi(σRi =1) > pi(σE =1) > pi(σE =0) > pi(σRi =0), so σRi is more precise than σE. 
Proof of Proposition 2: If the individual is employed, but the unemployment rate is high
in the individual’s mecro-economy, then he will vote for the challenger when
pi(1− ρ)(1− L)
(1− pi)ρ(1−H) + pi(1− ρ)(1− L) < pi ⇐⇒ ρ >
1− L
2− L−H . (9)
which is assumed to be true as in (8). If, instead, the individual is unemployed, but the
unemployment rate is low, then the individual will vote for the incumbent when
piρL
piρL+ (1− pi)(1− ρ)H > pi ⇐⇒ ρ >
H
L+H
, (10)
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which is satisfied whenever (1) is true. 
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